Equilibrium structure in an economic model of conflict.
Four different types of equilibrium are possible within a two-player model of society where only armed self-enforcement of property rights is possible. The main underlying parameters are the total resource endowment and the initial distribution of this endowment between the players. The parameter...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 35; pp. 480 - 495 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
July 1997
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510836915&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510836915 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: July 1997 vid: 35 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 510836915 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb02026.x ppf: 480 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: T tig: atl: Equilibrium structure in an economic model of conflict. aug: au: Neary, Hugh M. su: Property rights Mathematical models Military spending Nash equilibrium Economics Game theory Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Mathematical models of income distribution sug: subj: Property rights Mathematical models Military spending Nash equilibrium Economics Game theory Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Mathematical models of income distribution ab: Four different types of equilibrium are possible within a two-player model of society where only armed self-enforcement of property rights is possible. The main underlying parameters are the total resource endowment and the initial distribution of this endowment between the players. The parameter space is partitioned into regions in which the respective types of equilibrium occur. The equilibrium types involve positive arms expenditure by, respectively, neither player, the richer player, and both players; the latter case involves a sub-type in which the poorer player's entire endowment is expended on arms. Reprinted by permission of Western Economic International 7400 Center Ave., Ste. 109, Huntington Beach, CA 92647-3039, USA. Ph. 1-714-898-3222, Fax 1-714-891-6715. E-mail [|Wu]info @weainternational.org[|WU] [|Wu]http://www.weainternational.org.[|WU] pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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