A test of a theory of strategically retaliatory trade barriers.
The formation of strategic trade barriers is investigated within a game-theoretic lobbying model. In the model, trade barriers comprise a political component and a strategically retaliatory component that serves to prevent foreign protectionism, and within this theoretical framework, the best polic...
| Published in: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 64; pp. 425 - 450 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Southern Economic Association
October 1997
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510852870&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510852870 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: October 1997 vid: 64 pid: 1482 pub: Southern Economic Association artinfo: ui: 510852870 10.2307/1060859 ppf: 425 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: T tig: atl: A test of a theory of strategically retaliatory trade barriers. aug: au: Gawande, Kishore su: Economics Game theory Nontariff trade barriers Commercial policy Lobbying Lobbyists United States sug: subj: United States Economics Game theory Nontariff trade barriers Commercial policy Lobbying Lobbyists ab: The formation of strategic trade barriers is investigated within a game-theoretic lobbying model. In the model, trade barriers comprise a political component and a strategically retaliatory component that serves to prevent foreign protectionism, and within this theoretical framework, the best policy is to establish retaliatory barriers against all imports, even though the partner country protects only a subset of goods that are traded. Testing this theory using cross-industry U.S. nontariff barrier (NTB) statistics against nine developed countries in 1983 reveals that bilateral nontariff barriers erected by the U.S. against these nine nations have a significant and large retaliatory element. This is surprising, as General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization rules prohibit explicit retaliation except under special circumstances. The structure of U.S. NTBs in 1983 implies that domestic trade rules that permit protection in the form of antidumping duties, countervailing duties, voluntary export restraints, and quotas also allow some latitude in strategically reacting to protection in its partner nations. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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