Experience-dependent information diffusion and product quality.
In a monopoly market for an experience good the diffusion of product-quality information may depend on whether or not the information is favorable. To capture this asymmetry, our model uses as its information source a quality survey which suffers from response bias. Consumers may attempt to adjust...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 36; pp. 161 - 171 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
January 1998
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510873741&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510873741 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: January 1998 vid: 36 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 510873741 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01703.x ppf: 161 ppct: 10 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: T tig: atl: Experience-dependent information diffusion and product quality. aug: au: Kamp, Brad su: Economic expectations Mathematical models of economics Monopolies Reservation wage Customer satisfaction Mathematical models of marketing Product quality Information theory in economics sug: subj: Economic expectations Mathematical models of economics Monopolies Reservation wage Customer satisfaction Mathematical models of marketing Product quality Information theory in economics ab: In a monopoly market for an experience good the diffusion of product-quality information may depend on whether or not the information is favorable. To capture this asymmetry, our model uses as its information source a quality survey which suffers from response bias. Consumers may attempt to adjust for bias, but are not required to do so correctly. As a result, quality under perfect information need not be, and usually will not be, higher than quality under imperfect information. In addition, the externality exerted by informed consumers on uninformed consumers may not be the traditional beneficial externality. Reprinted by permission of Western Economic International, 7400 Center Ave., Ste. 109, Huntington Beach, CA 92647-3039 USA, Ph. 1-714-898-3222, Fax 1-714-891-6715, E-mail [|Wu]info@weainternational.org[|WU] [|Wu]http://www.weainternational.org[|WU] pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|