Special Interest Capture of Regulatory Agencies: A Ten-Year Analysis of Voting Behavior on Regional Fishery Management Councils.

This article tests capture theory by analyzing voting behavior on U.S. Regional Fishery Management Councils. Some seats on the councils are reserved for state and federal agency representatives; others, for political appointees. The political appointees primarily represent special interests (specifi...

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Publicado en:	Policy Studies Journal Vol. 38; no. 3; pp. 447 - 465
Autores principales:	Thomas, Craig W., Soule, A. Bradley, Davis, Tyler Blake
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell August 2010
Materias:	United States. National Marine Fisheries Service Government agencies Decision making Fishery management Pressure groups United States
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost