Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?
Does understanding how U.S. Supreme Court justices actually decide cases undermine the institutional legitimacy of the nation's highest court? To the extent that ordinary people recognize that the justices are deciding legal disputes on the basis of their own ideological biases and preferences (lega...
| Publicado en: | Law & Society Review Vol. 45; no. 1; pp. 195 - 220 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
March 2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510994023&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510994023 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00239216 LSR jtl: Law & Society Review issn: 00239216 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: March 2011 vid: 45 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 510994023 ppf: 195 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 10.2MB tig: atl: Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court? aug: au: Gibson, James L. Caldeira, Gregory A. su: United States. Supreme Court Legal realism Judicial process United States sug: subj: United States United States. Supreme Court Legal realism Judicial process ab: Does understanding how U.S. Supreme Court justices actually decide cases undermine the institutional legitimacy of the nation's highest court? To the extent that ordinary people recognize that the justices are deciding legal disputes on the basis of their own ideological biases and preferences (legal realism and the attitudinal model), the belief that the justices merely “apply” the law (mechanical jurisprudence and the myth of legality) is difficult to sustain. Although it is easy to see how the legitimacy of the Supreme Court, the most unaccountable of all American political institutions, is nurtured by the view that judicial decisionmaking is discretionless and mechanical, the sources of institutional legitimacy under legal realism are less obvious. Here, we demonstrate, using a nationally representative sample, that the American people understand judicial decisionmaking in realistic terms, that they extend legitimacy to the Supreme Court, and they do so under the belief that judges exercise their discretion in a principled and sincere fashion. Belief in mechanical jurisprudence is therefore not a necessary underpinning of judicial legitimacy; belief in legal realism is not incompatible with legitimacy. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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