Code Creation in Endogenous Merger Experiments.

We study the conflict that can occur in a merger due to firms' use of specialized language, or “code,” and whether participants accurately forecast this difficulty. After creating a shared code to describe different pictures accurately, subjects bid for extra payments to join a merged group. The two...

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Publicado en:Economic Inquiry Vol. 48; no. 2; pp. 337 - 353
Autores principales: Feiler, Lauren, Camerer, Colin F.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell April 2010
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00200.x
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        atl: Code Creation in Endogenous Merger Experiments.
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          Feiler, Lauren
          Camerer, Colin F.
      su:
        Mergers & acquisitions
        Experimental economics
        Corporate culture
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        subj:
          Mergers & acquisitions
          Experimental economics
          Corporate culture
      ab: We study the conflict that can occur in a merger due to firms' use of specialized language, or “code,” and whether participants accurately forecast this difficulty. After creating a shared code to describe different pictures accurately, subjects bid for extra payments to join a merged group. The two lowest bidders are placed in the merged group. Values inferred from two different bidding procedures indicate fairly accurate general appraisals of the cost of the merger, but the values of those subjects who bid the least, and choose to join the merged group, are too optimistic, reflecting an “organizational winner's curse.” (JEL D23, D83, G34, L21, M14)
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    language: English
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