Variable payment schemes and industrial relations: evidence from Germany.
The writers examine the empirical determinants of piece rates and profit sharing schemes. They analyze establishment data from Germany and contend that collective agreements make profit sharing less likely but that piece rates and profit sharing are more likely within the sector covered by collecti...
| Publicado en: | Kyklos Vol. 51; no. 2; pp. 237 - 258 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
1998
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511034030&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511034030 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00235962 KYK jtl: Kyklos issn: 00235962 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 1998 vid: 51 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 511034030 10.1111/1467-6435.00047 ppf: 237 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: T tig: atl: Variable payment schemes and industrial relations: evidence from Germany. aug: au: Heywood, John S. Hübler, Olaf Jirjahn, Uwe su: Piecework Profit-sharing Wages Works councils Industrial relations Germany sug: subj: Germany Piecework Profit-sharing Wages Works councils Industrial relations ab: The writers examine the empirical determinants of piece rates and profit sharing schemes. They analyze establishment data from Germany and contend that collective agreements make profit sharing less likely but that piece rates and profit sharing are more likely within the sector covered by collective agreements because of the presence of work councils. In addition, they contend that piece rates are made more likely in the uncovered sector by the use of teams. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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