The political economy of wildlife exploitation.

A study examines the conflicting interests of an agency managing and owning wildlife resources and the indigenous people living near the wildlife in a Third World context. A model is constructed that assumes that the wildlife habitat is of fixed size and the agricultural production of the local peo...

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Publicado en:Land Economics Vol. 74; no. 1; pp. 16 - 32
Autores principales: Skonhoft, Anders, Solstad, Jan Tore
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: University of Wisconsin Press February 1998
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The political economy of wildlife exploitation.
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          Skonhoft, Anders
          Solstad, Jan Tore
      su:
        Resource exploitation
        Property rights
        Poaching
        Mathematical models
        Exploitation
        Economics
        Wildlife conservation
      sug:
        subj:
          Resource exploitation
          Property rights
          Poaching
          Mathematical models
          Exploitation
          Economics
          Wildlife conservation
      keyword: Wildlife management -- Developing countries
      ab: A study examines the conflicting interests of an agency managing and owning wildlife resources and the indigenous people living near the wildlife in a Third World context. A model is constructed that assumes that the wildlife habitat is of fixed size and the agricultural production of the local people takes place outside the habitat area. In the model, the agency managing the habitat area has the legal right to exploit the wildlife, whereas the local people hunt illegally. Findings reveal that based on the concept of relative harvesting dominance, the stock utilization depends critically on the prevalent economic and ecological circumstances. Findings also reveal that the existing property-rights regime takes different forms depending on the economic and ecological environment.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
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    language: English
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