Self-defense, collective obligation, and noncombatant liability.
The writer examines the argument that civilians during a war are not entirely innocent because they have some control over what goes on in their country and attempts to determine just how far such an argument can actually go in justifying killing in war. As part of his analysis, he considers the br...
| Publicado en: | Social Theory & Practice Vol. 24; no. 1; pp. 57 - 82 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Florida State University, Dept. of Philosophy
Spring 1998
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The writer examines the argument that civilians during a war are not entirely innocent because they have some control over what goes on in their country and attempts to determine just how far such an argument can actually go in justifying killing in war. As part of his analysis, he considers the broader issues of the relevance of the ethics of self-defense to the ethics of war, the scope of the right of self-defense, and the conditions under which an individual shares in the blame for collective wrongdoing. |
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