Comparing post-cold war military conversion in the United States and Russia.
According to the conventional wisdom, military conversion in Russia would be more difficult than in the United States because Russia does not have the developed market infrastructure and institutions that help western defense firms redeploy resources for civilian production. A closer look raises dou...
| Publicado en: | Contemporary Economic Policy Vol. 16; no. 4; pp. 499 - 511 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
October 1998
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511081112&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511081112 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 10743529 CEY jtl: Contemporary Economic Policy issn: 10743529 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: October 1998 vid: 16 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 511081112 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1998.tb00537.x ppf: 499 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: T tig: atl: Comparing post-cold war military conversion in the United States and Russia. aug: au: Alexeev, Michael V. Sikorra, Raymond C. su: Economic conversion of defense industries Defense industries United States Russia sug: subj: United States Russia Economic conversion of defense industries Defense industries ab: According to the conventional wisdom, military conversion in Russia would be more difficult than in the United States because Russia does not have the developed market infrastructure and institutions that help western defense firms redeploy resources for civilian production. A closer look raises doubts about these arguments. Western defense firms have had difficulties with conversion because they cannot compete with the existing relatively efficient civilian firms. Meanwhile, the principal competitors of the Russian defense firms, the large Russian civilian enterprises, are closer in nature to defense enterprises than to efficient market firms. While this does not bode well for the Russian economy in general, the defense enterprises should not find themselves at a significant disadvantage in the civilian markets. Two effects can be distinguished. On the one hand, due to the more developed market infrastructure, the U.S. economy is presumably good at redeploying defence-related resources across firm boundaries. On the other hand, the large and efficient civilian sector in the United States makes the marginal “civilian” value of the redeployed resources low. It is the interaction of these factors, rather than the degree of development of market infrastructure alone, that determines the relative difficulty of military conversion. Additionally, empirical evidence based on regional data indicates that despite enormous defense expenditure cuts, the economic performance of Russia's regions is only relatively weakly correlated with the regions' dependency on defense industry. Reprinted by permission of Western Economic International 7400 Center Ave., Ste. 109, Huntington Beach, CA 92647–3039, USA Ph. 1–714–898–3222, Fax 1–714–891–6715 E-mail info@weainternational.org http://www.weainternational.org pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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