On the evidence of a working spouse penalty in the managerial labor market.
An analysis is presented of March 1993 Current Population Survey data that suggests that managers with working wives earn lower wages than their counterparts with nonworking wives. The labor supply decisions of managers' wives seem to be unaffected—that is, “exogenous” with respect to—by their husb...
| Publicado en: | Industrial & Labor Relations Review Vol. 52; no. 3; pp. 410 - 424 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cornell University
April 1999
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | An analysis is presented of March 1993 Current Population Survey data that suggests that managers with working wives earn lower wages than their counterparts with nonworking wives. The labor supply decisions of managers' wives seem to be unaffected—that is, “exogenous” with respect to—by their husbands' wages. In contrast, there is evidence that the labor supply decision of nonmanagers' wives are affected by their husbands' wages, and when the analysis takes account of the endogeneity, it is found that nonmanagers do not encounter a working spouse penalty. |
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