An experimental investigation of research tournaments.

Research tournaments are predicted to encourage R&D. Recent theoretical developments in research tournaments are grounded in search theory. Although the economic intuition behind tournaments is straightforward, computing equilibrium strategies is complex. The participants compute a stopping rule bas...

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Publicado en:Economic Inquiry Vol. 37; no. 4; pp. 624 - 637
Autores principales: Fullerton, Richard L., Linster, Bruce G., McKee, Michael
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell October 1999
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: October 1999
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      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
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        10.1111/j.1465-7295.1999.tb01452.x
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        atl: An experimental investigation of research tournaments.
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        au:
          Fullerton, Richard L.
          Linster, Bruce G.
          McKee, Michael
      su:
        Labor economics
        Tournaments
        Industrial research
        Mathematical models
      sug:
        subj:
          Labor economics
          Tournaments
          Industrial research
          Mathematical models
      keyword: Tournaments (Economics)
      ab: Research tournaments are predicted to encourage R&D. Recent theoretical developments in research tournaments are grounded in search theory. Although the economic intuition behind tournaments is straightforward, computing equilibrium strategies is complex. The participants compute a stopping rule based on the number of participants, the prize and the cost of research. It is an empirical question whether agents will behave as predicted or will employ simple “rule of thumb” strategies such as taking a predetermined number of draws. This paper reports the results of a series of laboratory experiments designed to test the predictions of the search model of tournaments. (JEL C9, D8) Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
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      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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