Pre-trial bargining and litigation: the search for fairness and efficiency.

The writers examine the ways in which different bargaining procedures asymmetric information affect fairness, which is an essential component of any system of justice. They analyze the equilibria of a pre-trial bargaining model for both fairness and efficiency, investigating whether fair and effici...

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Publicado en:Law & Society Review Vol. 34; no. 2; pp. 431 - 457
Autores principales: Howard, Robert M., Chard, Richard E., Kaji, Joel T.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell 2000
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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          Howard, Robert M.
          Chard, Richard E.
          Kaji, Joel T.
      su:
        Fairness
        Pre-trial procedure
        Game theory
        Civil procedure
        Decision making
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        subj:
          Fairness
          Pre-trial procedure
          Game theory
          Civil procedure
          Decision making
      ab: The writers examine the ways in which different bargaining procedures asymmetric information affect fairness, which is an essential component of any system of justice. They analyze the equilibria of a pre-trial bargaining model for both fairness and efficiency, investigating whether fair and efficient equilibria are possible and whether they occur for common parameter values. They characterize their behavioral and distributional properties and conclude that fairness is a primary concern to litigants and society and that fair and efficient equilibria are possible.
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    language: English
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