Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments.
We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the properties that ind...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 120; no. 2; pp. 155 - 175 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
February 2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511237430&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511237430 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: February 2005 vid: 120 iid: 2 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 511237430 10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.004 ppf: 155 ppct: 20 formats: tig: atl: Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments. aug: au: Maniquet, François Sprumont, Yves su: Welfare economics Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Social order sug: subj: Welfare economics Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Social order ab: We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the properties that individual welfare levels below the stand-alone lower bound (respectively, above the unanimity upper bound) should be increased (respectively, reduced). Combining either property with efficiency and robustness properties with respect to changes in the set of agents, we obtain a kind of welfare egalitarianism based on a constructed numerical representation of individual preferences. Copyright (c) 2004 Elsevier (USA) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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