Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain.
We consider the problem of efficiently allocating several indivisible objects between agents who are to receive at most one object and whose preferences are private information. We examine this standard “assignment” problem from the perspective of mechanism design giving up the usual assumption of l...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 123; no. 2; pp. 161 - 187 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Academic Press Inc.
August 2005
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511252984&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511252984 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: August 2005 vid: 123 iid: 2 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 511252984 10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.004 ppf: 161 ppct: 26 formats: tig: atl: Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain. aug: au: Bogomolnaia, Anna Deb, Rajat Ehlers, Lars su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Consumer preferences Mathematical models sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Consumer preferences Mathematical models ab: We consider the problem of efficiently allocating several indivisible objects between agents who are to receive at most one object and whose preferences are private information. We examine this standard “assignment” problem from the perspective of mechanism design giving up the usual assumption of linear preferences and instead using a full preference domain (with indifferences permitted). We characterize two classes of mechanisms: (i) Bi-polar Serially Dictatorial Rules by Essential Single-Valuedness, Pareto Indifference, Strategy-Proofness and Non-Bossiness; and (ii) all selections from Bi-polar Serially Dictatorial Rules by Single-Valuedness, Efficiency, Strategy-Proofness and Weak Non-Bossiness. We compare the outcomes from the (Bi-polar) Serially Dictatorial Rules with the outcomes obtained using a market based approach, namely the “core” of the market. We show that all strongly efficient outcomes in the core can be generated using Serially Dictatorial Rules. Moreover, we argue that Serially Dictatorial Rules have an advantage over the market based approach in that they yield strongly efficient solutions for all preference profiles, making it possible to use randomization to restore equity. When preferences are private information, this type of ex ante equity cannot be implemented using the market based approach. Copyright (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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