On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems.
We consider the priority-based allocation problem: there is a set of indivisible objects with multiple supplies (e.g., schools with seats) and a set of agents (e.g., students) with priorities over objects (e.g., proximity of residence area). We study two well-known and competing mechanisms. The agen...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 127; no. 1; pp. 155 - 172 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
March 2006
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511276282&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511276282 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: March 2006 vid: 127 iid: 1 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 511276282 10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.001 ppf: 155 ppct: 17 formats: tig: atl: On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems. aug: au: Kesten, Onur su: Economics Indivisibles (Philosophy) Resource allocation -- Mathematical models sug: subj: Economics Indivisibles (Philosophy) Resource allocation -- Mathematical models keyword: Indivisible goods ab: We consider the priority-based allocation problem: there is a set of indivisible objects with multiple supplies (e.g., schools with seats) and a set of agents (e.g., students) with priorities over objects (e.g., proximity of residence area). We study two well-known and competing mechanisms. The agent-optimal stable mechanism (AOSM) allots objects via the deferred acceptance algorithm. The top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) allots objects via Gale's top trading cycles algorithm. We show that the two mechanisms are equivalent, or TTCM is fair (i.e., respects agents' priorities), or resource monotonic, or population monotonic, if and only if the priority structure is acyclic. Furthermore, if AOSM fails to be efficient (consistent) for a problem, TTCM also fails to be fair (consistent) for it. However, the converse is not necessarily true. Copyright (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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