Reasoning on the Threshold: Testing the Separability of Preferences in Legal Decision Making.
One hundred fifteen law students were given a mock brief with identical legal arguments on both sides of a standing dispute in litigation involving restrictions on political expression of public employees. The content of the expression at issue (pro-choice vs. pro-life) and the jurisdiction where th...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Politics Vol. 68; no. 2; pp. 308 - 322 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
May 2006
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511288605&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511288605 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223816 JPO jtl: Journal of Politics issn: 00223816 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May 2006 vid: 68 iid: 2 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 511288605 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00408.x ppf: 308 ppct: 14 formats: tig: atl: Reasoning on the Threshold: Testing the Separability of Preferences in Legal Decision Making. aug: au: Braman, Eileen su: Human behavior Judges Judicial process United States sug: subj: United States Human behavior Judges Judicial process ab: One hundred fifteen law students were given a mock brief with identical legal arguments on both sides of a standing dispute in litigation involving restrictions on political expression of public employees. The content of the expression at issue (pro-choice vs. pro-life) and the jurisdiction where the case was pending (with vs. without controlling authority on the standing issue) were experimentally manipulated. Participants' policy views on (1) abortion, (2) free speech and (3) Hatch Act restrictions were measured to assess their influence on the standing decision. In line with traditional notions of legal reasoning, participants were able to separate their views on Hatch Act restrictions from the standing decision. Opinions on free speech, however, influenced judgments consistent with attitudinal hypotheses. Also, participants' opinions on abortion interacted with speech content to influence judgments—but in a manner not wholly consistent with legal or attitudinal accounts of decision-making. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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