Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions.

This paper presents two results about preference domain conditions that deepen our understanding of anonymous and monotonic Arrovian social welfare functions (ASWFs). We characterize the class of anonymous and monotonic ASWFs on domains without Condorcet triples. This extends and generalizes an earl...

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Publicado en:Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 128; no. 1; pp. 232 - 255
Autores principales: Sethuraman, Jay, Teo, Chung-Piaw, Vohra, Rakesh V.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Academic Press Inc. May 2006
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions.
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          Sethuraman, Jay
          Teo, Chung-Piaw
          Vohra, Rakesh V.
      su:
        Welfare economics
        Majorities
        Mathematical models
        Political systems
      sug:
        subj:
          Welfare economics
          Majorities
          Mathematical models
          Political systems
      ab: This paper presents two results about preference domain conditions that deepen our understanding of anonymous and monotonic Arrovian social welfare functions (ASWFs). We characterize the class of anonymous and monotonic ASWFs on domains without Condorcet triples. This extends and generalizes an earlier characterization (as Generalized Majority Rules) by Moulin (Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988) for single-peaked domains. We also describe a domain where anonymous and monotonic ASWFs exist only when there are an odd number of agents. This is a counter-example to a claim by Muller (Int. Econ. Rev. 23 (1982) 609), who asserted that the existence of 3-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs guaranteed the existence of n-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs for any n>3. Both results build upon the integer programming approach to the study of ASWFs introduced in Sethuraman et al. (Math. Oper. Res. 28 (2003) 309). Copyright (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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