The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices.
We show that any communication finding a value-maximizing allocation in a private-information economy must also discover supporting prices (in general personalized and nonlinear). In particular, to allocate L indivisible items between two agents, a price must be revealed for each of the 2L-1 bundles...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 129; no. 1; pp. 192 - 225 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
July 2006
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511301458&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511301458 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: July 2006 vid: 129 iid: 1 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 511301458 10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.007 ppf: 192 ppct: 33 formats: tig: atl: The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices. aug: au: Nisan, Noam Segal, Ilya su: Prices -- Mathematical models Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Communication in economics sug: subj: Prices -- Mathematical models Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Communication in economics ab: We show that any communication finding a value-maximizing allocation in a private-information economy must also discover supporting prices (in general personalized and nonlinear). In particular, to allocate L indivisible items between two agents, a price must be revealed for each of the 2L-1 bundles. We prove that all monotonic prices for an agent must be used, hence exponential communication in L is needed. Furthermore, exponential communication is needed just to ensure a higher share of surplus than that realized by auctioning all items as a bundle, or even a higher expected surplus (for some probability distribution over valuations). When the utilities are submodular, efficiency still requires exponential communication (and fully polynomial approximation is impossible). When the items are identical, arbitrarily good approximation is obtained with exponentially less communication than exact efficiency. Copyright (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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