Inequality and outside options in common-property resource use.

Using a dynamic intergenerational game, this paper analyzes the effects of inequality among resource users and their access to outside markets and credit on cooperative use of a local commons. The study finds that, depending on the agents' harvest sharing rule, the conditions under which homogeneous...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of Development Economics Vol. 83; no. 1; pp. 214 - 240
Main Author: Tarui, Nori
Format: Article
Published: Elsevier Science May 2007
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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      dt: May 2007
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      pub: Elsevier Science
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        10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.01.002
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        atl: Inequality and outside options in common-property resource use.
      aug:
        au: Tarui, Nori
      su:
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        Library cooperation
        Equality
        Commons
        Mathematical models
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        subj:
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          Library cooperation
          Equality
          Commons
          Mathematical models
      ab: Using a dynamic intergenerational game, this paper analyzes the effects of inequality among resource users and their access to outside markets and credit on cooperative use of a local commons. The study finds that, depending on the agents' harvest sharing rule, the conditions under which homogeneous agents can cooperate in equilibrium may not be sufficient for cooperation when agents differ in harvesting productivity. The resource users' access to outside markets or credit may have a negative effect on efficient local resource management. Copyright (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V.
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      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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