Budget Support versus Project Aid: A Theoretical Appraisal.

Should donors interested in the effectiveness of developmental programmes rely on conditional budget support or on project aid? To answer this question, we present a model in which only a subset of developmental expenditures can be subject to conditionality. We show that budget support is preferable...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Economic Journal Vol. 117; pp. 1260 - 1280
Autores principales: Cordella, Tito, Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell October 2007
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02082.x
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        atl: Budget Support versus Project Aid: A Theoretical Appraisal.
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          Cordella, Tito
          Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni
      su:
        Financing of economic development projects
        International economic assistance
        Mathematical models
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        subj:
          Financing of economic development projects
          International economic assistance
          Mathematical models
      ab: Should donors interested in the effectiveness of developmental programmes rely on conditional budget support or on project aid? To answer this question, we present a model in which only a subset of developmental expenditures can be subject to conditionality. We show that budget support is preferable to project aid when the preferences of donors and recipients are aligned, and when assistance is small relative to the recipients' own resources. Furthermore, when donors cannot observe the recipient's type, they may impose higher levels of conditionality to separate committed governments from uncommitted ones. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
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    language: English
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