Is it Fair to ‘Make Work Pay’?
The writers propose a new fair allocation, labeled a “Pareto-efficient and shared resources equivalent” allocation. They explain that, as the name implies, the optimal allocation is Pareto-efficient and all individuals are indifferent between their bundle and what they would receive if it were phys...
| Publicado en: | Economica Vol. 74; pp. 599 - 627 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
November 2007
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511366472&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511366472 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00130427 ECA jtl: Economica issn: 00130427 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: November 2007 vid: 74 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 511366472 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00566.x ppf: 599 ppct: 28 formats: tig: atl: Is it Fair to ‘Make Work Pay’? aug: au: Luttens, Roland Iwan Ooghe, Erwin su: Welfare economics Social order Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Income tax sug: subj: Welfare economics Social order Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Income tax ab: The writers propose a new fair allocation, labeled a “Pareto-efficient and shared resources equivalent” allocation. They explain that, as the name implies, the optimal allocation is Pareto-efficient and all individuals are indifferent between their bundle and what they would receive if it were physically possible to divide or share all resources. They examine a discrete Stiglitz economy with four types—defined by a low or high productive skill and low or high taste for working—and a government that seeks to introduce fair taxes but cannot see individuals' type. They demonstrate that a fair system would subsidize low earners, as long as low-skilled individuals have a strictly positive skill. Using a sample of Belgian singles, they also suggest that negative marginal tax rates, and therefore “making work pay” policies, are not optimal in a reasonable case where at least some unemployed people are willing to work but are prevented by exogenous labor market constraints. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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