Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems.
We study a two-player one-arm bandit problem in discrete time, in which the risky arm can have two possible types, high and low, the decision to stop experimenting is irreversible, and players observe each other's actions but not each other's payoffs. We prove that all equilibria are in cutoff strat...
| Publicado en: | Econometrica Vol. 75; no. 6; pp. 1591 - 1612 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
November 2007
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511366526&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511366526 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00129682 ECN jtl: Econometrica issn: 00129682 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: November 2007 vid: 75 iid: 6 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 511366526 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00807.x ppf: 1591 ppct: 21 formats: tig: atl: Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems. aug: au: Rosenberg, Dinah Solan, Eilon Vieille, Nicolas su: Social learning Economics Game theory Slot machines sug: subj: Social learning Economics Game theory Slot machines ab: We study a two-player one-arm bandit problem in discrete time, in which the risky arm can have two possible types, high and low, the decision to stop experimenting is irreversible, and players observe each other's actions but not each other's payoffs. We prove that all equilibria are in cutoff strategies and provide several qualitative results on the sequence of cutoffs. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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