The Crisis of 1873: Perspectives from Multiple Asset Classes.

This article analyzes asset pricing behavior during the period leading up to the Crisis of 1873. Evidence is presented that equities, options, and bonds priced risks consistently, suggesting that investors were actively monitoring the risk of investing and were not caught up in an irrational, specul...

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Publicado en:Journal of Economic History Vol. 68; no. 3; pp. 722 - 758
Autor principal: Mixon, Scott
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press September 2008
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The Crisis of 1873: Perspectives from Multiple Asset Classes.
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        Railroads
        History of railroads
        Stock prices
        History
        Financial crises
        United States
      sug:
        subj:
          United States
          Railroads
          History of railroads
          Stock prices
          History
          Financial crises
      ab: This article analyzes asset pricing behavior during the period leading up to the Crisis of 1873. Evidence is presented that equities, options, and bonds priced risks consistently, suggesting that investors were actively monitoring the risk of investing and were not caught up in an irrational, speculative mania. Implied probability density functions for stock returns suggest that option markets exhibited growing concern about substantial price declines prior to the crash. Concerns were concentrated on riskier, more leveraged firms. Deteriorating balance sheet fundamentals for the riskiest U.S. railroads set the stage for a market disruption in 1873 as information asymmetries worsened. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
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    language: English
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