The Optimal Provision of Local Public Goods in a Metropolitan Area with Flexible Jurisdictional Boundaries.

In this paper, we analyze the optimal structure of a monocentric city that has multiple jurisdictions. The cost of providing a public good depends on both the area of the jurisdiction and the quality of the service, both of which are endogenous variables. We show that the optimal quality of the publ...

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Publicado en:Journal of Regional Science Vol. 49; no. 2; pp. 349 - 360
Autor principal: Okamoto, Ryosuke
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell May 2009
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: May 2009
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      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
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        10.1111/j.1467-9787.2008.00586.x
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        atl: The Optimal Provision of Local Public Goods in a Metropolitan Area with Flexible Jurisdictional Boundaries.
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        au: Okamoto, Ryosuke
      su:
        Municipal services
        Industrial location
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        Metropolitan government
        Mathematical models
        Local government
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        subj:
          Municipal services
          Industrial location
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          Metropolitan government
          Mathematical models
          Local government
      ab: In this paper, we analyze the optimal structure of a monocentric city that has multiple jurisdictions. The cost of providing a public good depends on both the area of the jurisdiction and the quality of the service, both of which are endogenous variables. We show that the optimal quality of the public good decreases as distance from the central business district (CBD) increases if the public good and the housing lot are substitutes, and may increase if they are complements. The optimal population density always decreases as distance from the CBD increases. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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