“Almost” subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting.

Consider a population of citizens uniformly spread over the entire plane. The population faces a problem of locating public facilities financed by its users, who face an idiosyncratic private access cost to the facility. We show that, under mild assumptions, an external intervention that covers a ti...

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Publicado en:Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 143; no. 1; pp. 275 - 292
Autores principales: Drèze, Jacques, Le Breton, Michel, Savvateev, Alexei, Weber, Shlomo
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Academic Press Inc. November 2008
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: “Almost” subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting.
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        au:
          Drèze, Jacques
          Le Breton, Michel
          Savvateev, Alexei
          Weber, Shlomo
      su:
        Territorial jurisdiction
        Mathematical models
        Public buildings
        Facilities
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
      sug:
        subj:
          Territorial jurisdiction
          Mathematical models
          Public buildings
          Facilities
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
      keyword: Public facilities -- Location -- Mathematical models
      ab: Consider a population of citizens uniformly spread over the entire plane. The population faces a problem of locating public facilities financed by its users, who face an idiosyncratic private access cost to the facility. We show that, under mild assumptions, an external intervention that covers a tiny portion of the facility cost is sufficient to guarantee secession-proofness or no cross-subsidization, where no group of individuals is charged more than the cost incurred if it had acted on its own. Moreover, we demonstrate that in this case the Rawlsian access pricing is the only mechanism that rules out secession threats. Copyright (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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