Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects.

Subsidy-free VCG mechanisms assign p identical objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-negative valuations. The smallest efficiency loss L[Graphic Character Omitted](n,p) satisfies L[Graphic Character Omitted](n,p...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 144; no. 1; pp. 96 - 120
Autor principal:	Moulin, Hervé
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Academic Press Inc. January 2009
Materias:	Resource allocation > Mathematical models Budget Mathematical models
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost