Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty.
This paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information. Uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors of agents who have either Bewley's incomplete preferences or Gilboa-Schmeidler's maximin expected utility preferences. The main results characterize in...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 144; no. 1; pp. 337 - 354 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
January 2009
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511436963&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511436963 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: January 2009 vid: 144 iid: 1 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 511436963 10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.006 ppf: 337 ppct: 17 formats: tig: atl: Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty. aug: au: Kajii, Atsushi Ui, Takashi su: Information theory in economics Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Uncertainty Economics sug: subj: Information theory in economics Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Uncertainty Economics ab: This paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information. Uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors of agents who have either Bewley's incomplete preferences or Gilboa-Schmeidler's maximin expected utility preferences. The main results characterize interim efficient allocations under uncertainty; that is, they provide conditions on the sets of posteriors, thus implicitly on the way how agents update the sets of priors, for non-existence of a trade which makes all agents better off at any realization of private information. For agents with the incomplete preferences, the condition is necessary and sufficient, but for agents with the maximin expected utility preferences, the condition is sufficient only. A couple of necessary conditions for the latter case are provided. Copyright (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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