Learning about the Future and Dynamic Efficiency.
The conditions under which an efficient allocation of resources can be achieved in a dynamic private-values setting where the designer gradually learns about the distribution of agents' values are examined. It is demonstrated that the dynamic efficient assignment can always be achieved, providing a...
| Publicado en: | American Economic Review Vol. 99; no. 4; pp. 1576 - 1588 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
American Economic Association
September 2009
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The conditions under which an efficient allocation of resources can be achieved in a dynamic private-values setting where the designer gradually learns about the distribution of agents' values are examined. It is demonstrated that the dynamic efficient assignment can always be achieved, providing all payments can be delayed until the conclusion of the entire allocation process. |
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