Oligopoly meets oligopsony: The case of permits.
This paper derives market equilibria (in demand functions and in bidding strategies) between oligopolists and oligopsonists in a market with intermediates and no competition in final markets. To the best of my knowledge, this theme has not been explored, despite two observations: Firstly, the common...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Environmental Economics & Management Vol. 58; no. 3; pp. 329 - 338 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
November 2009
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511451495&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511451495 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00950696 EEM jtl: Journal of Environmental Economics & Management issn: 00950696 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: November 2009 vid: 58 iid: 3 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 511451495 10.1016/j.jeem.2009.04.006 ppf: 329 ppct: 9 formats: tig: atl: Oligopoly meets oligopsony: The case of permits. aug: au: Wirl, Franz su: Emissions trading Oligopolies Mathematical models sug: subj: Emissions trading Oligopolies Mathematical models keyword: Oligopsonies -- Mathematical models ab: This paper derives market equilibria (in demand functions and in bidding strategies) between oligopolists and oligopsonists in a market with intermediates and no competition in final markets. To the best of my knowledge, this theme has not been explored, despite two observations: Firstly, the commonly applied framework of non-competitive and competitive fringe firms has implausible properties for the limit of purely strategic players. Secondly, real world cases correspond at least potentially to such strategic interactions, e.g., non-competitive players selling and buying permits (CO2 and SO2). The major implications are that these non-competitive markets are characterized by a kind of double marginalization (on the demand and the supply side) resulting in too little trade and wrong price signals. Copyright (c) 2009 Elsevier Inc. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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