Market power in an exhaustible resource market: The case of storable pollution permits.

Motivated by the structure of existing pollution permit markets, we study the equilibrium path that results from allocating an initial stock of storable permits to an agent, or a group of agents, in a position to exercise market power. A large seller of permits exercises market power no differently...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Economic Journal Vol. 121; no. 551; pp. 116 - 145
Autores principales:	Liski, Matti, Montero, Juan-Pablo
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell March 2011
Materias:	Market power Government policy on pollution Mathematical models Licenses Resource allocation > Mathematical models Economic equilibrium
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost