Axioms for Deferred Acceptance.

The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agent-proposing deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms—individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity—are essent...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Econometrica Vol. 78; no. 2; pp. 633 - 654
Autores principales: Kojima, Fuhito, Manea, Mihai
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell March 2010
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511483246&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: ssf
    uiTerm: 511483246
    longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson)
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00129682
        ECN
      jtl: Econometrica
      issn: 00129682
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: March 2010
      vid: 78
      iid: 2
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        511483246
        10.3982/ECTA7443
      ppf: 633
      ppct: 21
      formats:
      tig:
        atl: Axioms for Deferred Acceptance.
      aug:
        au:
          Kojima, Fuhito
          Manea, Mihai
      su:
        Monotonic functions
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        Algorithms
      sug:
        subj:
          Monotonic functions
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          Algorithms
      ab: The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agent-proposing deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms—individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity—are essential to our analysis. An allocation rule is the agent-proposing deferred acceptance rule for some acceptant substitutable priority if and only if it satisfies non-wastefulness and individually rational monotonicity. An alternative characterization is in terms of non-wastefulness, population monotonicity, and weak Maskin monotonicity. We also offer an axiomatization of the deferred acceptance rule generated by an exogenously specified priority structure. We apply our results to characterize efficient deferred acceptance rules.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: N
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N