How the market solves an assignment problem: the matching of lawyers with legal claims.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 5; pp. 502 - 533
Autor principal: Spurr, Stephen J.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: University of Chicago Press October 1987 pt1
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Lawyers' fees
        Assignment problems (Programming)
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          Lawyers' fees
          Assignment problems (Programming)
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