Mechanism design with incomplete information: a solution to the implementation problem.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Journal of Political Economy Vol. 97; pp. 668 - 692
Autores principales: Palfrey, Thomas R., Srivastava, Sanjay
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: University of Chicago Press June 1989
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: June 1989
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      pub: University of Chicago Press
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        10.1086/261621
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        atl: Mechanism design with incomplete information: a solution to the implementation problem.
      aug:
        au:
          Palfrey, Thomas R.
          Srivastava, Sanjay
      su:
        Economics
        Game theory
        Information theory in economics
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        Economic equilibrium
      sug:
        subj:
          Economics
          Game theory
          Information theory in economics
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          Economic equilibrium
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
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    language: English
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