Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 56; pp. 378 - 400
Autores principales: Mookherjee, Dilip, Reichelstein, Stefan
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Academic Press Inc. April 1992
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        10.1016/0022-0531(92)90088-Y
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          Mookherjee, Dilip
          Reichelstein, Stefan
      su:
        Bayesian analysis
        Contracts
        Labor incentives
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        Agency theory
        Utility theory
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        subj:
          Bayesian analysis
          Contracts
          Labor incentives
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          Agency theory
          Utility theory
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
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    language: English
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