Learning and incentive problems in repeated partnerships.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:International Economic Review Vol. 34; pp. 101 - 120
Autor principal: Hirao, Yukiko
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell February 1993
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Business partnerships
        Contracts
        Labor incentives
        Mathematical models
        Agency theory
        Information theory in economics
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          Business partnerships
          Contracts
          Labor incentives
          Mathematical models
          Agency theory
          Information theory in economics
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
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    language: English
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