Incentives for information production and optimal job assignment with human capital considerations.
| Publicado en: | Economica Vol. 60; pp. 13 - 27 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
February 1993
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
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