Nash-Cournot or Lindahl behavior? an empirical test for the NATO allies.

A study derived systems of demand equations for distinguishing between Nash-Cournot and Lindahl allocation behavior in a group that either shares a pure public good or an activity that provides a private and a pure public joint product. Each method has its own implications for the resulting optimal...

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Publicado en:Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 105; pp. 875 - 895
Autores principales: Sandler, Todd, Murdoch, James C.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / UK November 1990
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: November 1990
      vid: 105
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      pub: Oxford University Press / UK
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        atl: Nash-Cournot or Lindahl behavior? an empirical test for the NATO allies.
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        au:
          Sandler, Todd
          Murdoch, James C.
      su:
        North Atlantic Treaty Organization
        Mathematical models
        Joint products
        Mathematical models of consumption
        Public goods
        Nash equilibrium
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
      sug:
        subj:
          North Atlantic Treaty Organization
          Mathematical models
          Joint products
          Mathematical models of consumption
          Public goods
          Nash equilibrium
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
      ab: A study derived systems of demand equations for distinguishing between Nash-Cournot and Lindahl allocation behavior in a group that either shares a pure public good or an activity that provides a private and a pure public joint product. Each method has its own implications for the resulting optimality implied by the equilibrium associated with the allocation procedure. Systems of simultaneous equations were estimated based on Nash-Cournot and Lindahl behavior for a sample of 10 North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies for the 1956-87 period. Nonnested hypothesis tests supported the Nash-Cournot specification for 5 of the 10 sample allies, but no evidence of Lindahl behavior was found. In addition, the Nash-Cournot joint-product specification outperformed the Nash-Cournot pure public model for all sample NATO members.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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