Pricing schemes and Cournotian equilibria.
The Cournot and monopolistic competition models are essentially the two basic models for studying oligopolistic competition. A reinterpretation of the Cournot equilibrium is proposed based on a general and formal coordination device—the pricing scheme—which satisfies some global and individual resp...
| Publicado en: | American Economic Review Vol. 81; pp. 666 - 674 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
American Economic Association
June 1991
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The Cournot and monopolistic competition models are essentially the two basic models for studying oligopolistic competition. A reinterpretation of the Cournot equilibrium is proposed based on a general and formal coordination device—the pricing scheme—which satisfies some global and individual responsiveness properties. In the multisectoral case, an equilibrium concept is obtained that generalizes both the Cournot and monopolistic competition equilibria. This Cournotian monopolistic competition equilibrium can be described as the solution to the juxtaposition of numerous monopoly problems in which each monopolist faces a demand function contingent on both the equilibrium quantities produced in its own sector and the equilibrium prices set in the other sectors. |
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