Incentives to innovate in a Cournot oligopoly.
A model of a patent race between Cournot oligopolists that retains the basic framework of Lee and Wilde (1980) was developed to determine the pace of technological innovation. The model assumes a linear market demand function, constant marginal and average production costs, and a specific, well-beh...
| Publicado en: | Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 106; pp. 951 - 962 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / UK
August 1991
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | A model of a patent race between Cournot oligopolists that retains the basic framework of Lee and Wilde (1980) was developed to determine the pace of technological innovation. The model assumes a linear market demand function, constant marginal and average production costs, and a specific, well-behaved hazard function. The results indicate that an increase in the number of firms may result in a decrease in the equilibrium research and development effort of each firm and in the equilibrium total effort. It also demonstrates that in equilibrium there may be underinvestment with respect to the social optimum. |
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