Sequential bargaining as a noncooperative foundation for Walrasian equilibrium.
| Publicado en: | Econometrica Vol. 59; pp. 1395 - 1425 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
September 1991
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
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