Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked.
A mathematical model is used to consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity fairly among agents with single-peaked preferences. The methods of performing this division, or solutions, sought are ones that satisfy a consistency property. The property is: Any recommendation m...
| Published in: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 63; pp. 219 - 246 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Academic Press Inc.
August 1994
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | A mathematical model is used to consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity fairly among agents with single-peaked preferences. The methods of performing this division, or solutions, sought are ones that satisfy a consistency property. The property is: Any recommendation made for any economy is in agreement with the recommendation made for any “reduced” economy that is obtained by imagining the departure of some of the agents with their allotted consumptions. Essentially, all efficient subsolutions of the no-envy solution that satisfy consistency must contain a particular solution known as the uniform rule. This rule is characterized on the basis of a “converse” of consistency and the distributional requirement of individual rationality from equal division. |
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