Implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations.
The writer examines incentive aspects of the Linear Cost Share Equilibrium principle by designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with Linear Cost Share equilibrium allocations. The mechanisms presented permit not only preferences but also initial endowments to be privately observed, a c...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 64; pp. 568 - 585 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
December 1994
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=512506759&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 512506759 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: December 1994 vid: 64 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 512506759 10.1006/jeth.1994.1084 ppf: 568 ppct: 17 formats: tig: atl: Implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations. aug: au: Tian, Guoqiang su: Public goods Economic equilibrium Cost Mathematical models of economics Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Nash equilibrium sug: subj: Public goods Economic equilibrium Cost Mathematical models of economics Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Nash equilibrium ab: The writer examines incentive aspects of the Linear Cost Share Equilibrium principle by designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with Linear Cost Share equilibrium allocations. The mechanisms presented permit not only preferences but also initial endowments to be privately observed, a characteristic that is missing from much recent work in implementation theory. Mechanisms for both the withholding and destruction of endowments are provided. It is noted that if the commodity space is reinterpreted, the mechanisms also implement Walrasian allocations to economics with purely private goods. It is argued that these mechanisms are sufficiently general to cover Walrasian equilibria, Lindahl equilibria, and cost share equilibria, that is, they seem to represent “generic” mechanisms to implement competitive-type allocations in private and public goods economies. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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