The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences.
The writer examines the implications of the “replacement principle” for the fair allocation of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. He notes that the principle states that when one of the components of the data entering the description of the problem to be...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 76; pp. 145 - 169 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
September 1997
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=512541551&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 512541551 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: September 1997 vid: 76 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 512541551 10.1006/jeth.1997.2294 ppf: 145 ppct: 24 formats: tig: atl: The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences. aug: au: Thomson, William su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Mathematical models of economics Welfare economics sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Mathematical models of economics Welfare economics ab: The writer examines the implications of the “replacement principle” for the fair allocation of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. He notes that the principle states that when one of the components of the data entering the description of the problem to be solved alters, all of the relevant agents should be influenced in the same direction—they all gain or they all lose. He applies the principle to situations in which the preferences of one of the agents may alter, in the name “welfare-domination under preference-replacement.” He demonstrates that there is no selection from the no-envy and Pareto solution satisfying it. He weakens the principle by confining its application to situations in which the change is not so disruptive that it turns the economy from one in which there is “too little” of the commodity to one in which there is “too much,” or vice versa. He reveals that the only selection from the no-envy and Pareto solution satisfying this property and “replication-invariance” is the “uniform rule.” pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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