Implementability and horizontal equity imply no-envy.

The writers examine the relationship between no-envy and implementability in a general mathematical model. They demonstrate that in monotonically closed domains, the no-envy property is satisfied by any allocation rule that is both horizontally equitable and Nash Implementable. They note that this...

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Publicado en:Econometrica Vol. 65; no. 05; pp. 1215 - 1220
Autores principales: Fleurbaey, M., Maniquet, F.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell September 1997
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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          Fleurbaey, M.
          Maniquet, F.
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        Nash equilibrium
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
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          Nash equilibrium
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
      ab: The writers examine the relationship between no-envy and implementability in a general mathematical model. They demonstrate that in monotonically closed domains, the no-envy property is satisfied by any allocation rule that is both horizontally equitable and Nash Implementable. They note that this supports the notion that the no-envy requirement is justified not only from an equity point of view but also from an implementation standpoint and that it throws some light on previous findings where specific allocation rules defined over monotonically closed domains are characterized by Nash Implementability among other axioms.
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    language: English
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