A theory of misgovernance.
This paper tries to explain why government bureaucracies are often associated with red tape, corruption, and lack of incentives. The paper identifies two specific ingredients that together can provide an explanation: the fact that governments often act precisely in situations where markets fail and...
| Publicado en: | Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 112; pp. 1289 - 1333 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / UK
November 1997
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=512568983&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 512568983 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00335533 QJE jtl: Quarterly Journal of Economics issn: 00335533 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: November 1997 vid: 112 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / UK artinfo: ui: 512568983 10.1162/003355300555484 ppf: 1289 ppct: 44 formats: tig: atl: A theory of misgovernance. aug: au: Banerjee, Abhijit V. su: Bureaucracy Government paperwork Resource allocation -- Mathematical models sug: subj: Bureaucracy Government paperwork Resource allocation -- Mathematical models ab: This paper tries to explain why government bureaucracies are often associated with red tape, corruption, and lack of incentives. The paper identifies two specific ingredients that together can provide an explanation: the fact that governments often act precisely in situations where markets fail and the presence of agency problems within the government. We show that these problems are exacerbated at low levels of development and in bureaucracies dealing with poor people. We also argue that we need to posit the existence of a welfare-oriented constituency within the government in order to explain red tape and corruption. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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