Restricting the market for quota: an analysis of tobacco production rights with corroboration from congressional testimony.
Regulatory programs that restrict output levels often impose restrictions on the transfer of rights to produce or to use particular inputs. In this paper, we use a unique cross-section, time-series data set from North Carolina to quantify the welfare effects of transfer restrictions for poundage qu...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Political Economy Vol. 103; pp. 142 - 176 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
University of Chicago Press
February 1995
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=512575643&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 512575643 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223808 JPE jtl: Journal of Political Economy issn: 00223808 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: February 1995 vid: 103 pid: 415 pub: University of Chicago Press artinfo: ui: 512575643 10.1086/261979 ppf: 142 ppct: 34 formats: tig: atl: Restricting the market for quota: an analysis of tobacco production rights with corroboration from congressional testimony. aug: au: Rucker, Randal R. Thurman, Walter N. Sumner, Daniel A. su: Mathematical models Individual fishing quotas Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Tobacco industry Agricultural price supports North Carolina United States sug: subj: North Carolina United States Mathematical models Individual fishing quotas Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Tobacco industry Agricultural price supports ab: Regulatory programs that restrict output levels often impose restrictions on the transfer of rights to produce or to use particular inputs. In this paper, we use a unique cross-section, time-series data set from North Carolina to quantify the welfare effects of transfer restrictions for poundage quota under the U.S. flue-cured tobacco program. We find that the deadweight costs of such restrictions are small but that the distributional effects are substantial. We analyze congressional testimony on quota transfer legislation and conclude that our estimates of the distributional effects are consistent with expressed views of market participants. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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