Commission-revenue maximization in a general equilibrium model of asset creation.

Part of a special issue on financial innovation and security design. A general equilibrium model of endogenous asset formation is presented in which a monopolistic agent, called the designer, can create any types of assets and charge commissions as long as the total number of the types of assets is...

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Publicado en:Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 65; pp. 258 - 299
Autor principal: Hara, Chiaki
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Academic Press Inc. February 1995
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: February 1995
      vid: 65
      pid: 735
      pub: Academic Press Inc.
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        512575926
        10.1006/jeth.1995.1010
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        atl: Commission-revenue maximization in a general equilibrium model of asset creation.
      aug:
        au: Hara, Chiaki
      su:
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        Finance
        Mathematical models
        Innovations in business
        Securities
        Mathematical models of investments
        Economic equilibrium
      sug:
        subj:
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          Finance
          Mathematical models
          Innovations in business
          Securities
          Mathematical models of investments
          Economic equilibrium
      ab: Part of a special issue on financial innovation and security design. A general equilibrium model of endogenous asset formation is presented in which a monopolistic agent, called the designer, can create any types of assets and charge commissions as long as the total number of the types of assets is not greater than some given constant. The notion of an abstract cone is introduced in order to give the precise meaning to the limit of a sequence of budget sets. An existence theorem for the case where the designer can create no more than two assets is presented. The first of the two reasons for nonexistence of a commission-revenue maximizer is provided, and a nonexistence example is given for the case where the designer can create four assets. In addition, a case where no upper bound is imposed on the numbers of types of assets but where the number of types is endogenously determined by the designer is examined. The second of the reasons for nonexistence is then explained.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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