| Sumario: | The writers examine the welfare economic effects of information policy regarding road transport with elastic demand. They consider the impact of providing perfect, imperfect, or no information to uninformed and informed potential road users. They assume that the link travel cost functions are stochastic, and the information they provide to drivers concerns these random fluctuations. They use an economic equilibrium framework with elastic demand for road usage to account for the interaction between road usage and travel costs. They assume that the actors in the model base their decision making on rational expectations, that demand and link travel cost functions are linear, and that the population of travelers consists of an homogeneous group except for their respective willingness-to-pay for making a trip. They find that both the provision of perfect and imperfect information results in a strict Pareto improvement, and that the more perfect the information, the more efficient the use of the transport network. They outline their findings in relation to a two-link network.
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