On the political economy of education subsidies.

Standard models of public education provision predict an implicit transfer of resources from higher-income individuals toward lower-income individuals. Many studies have documented that public higher education involves a transfer in the reverse direction. We show that this pattern of redistributio...

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Publicado en:Review of Economic Studies Vol. 62; pp. 249 - 263
Autores principales: Fernandez, Raquel, Rogerson, Richard
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / UK April 1995
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: April 1995
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      pub: Oxford University Press / UK
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        atl: On the political economy of education subsidies.
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          Fernandez, Raquel
          Rogerson, Richard
      su:
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        University & college finance
        Higher education & economics
      sug:
        subj:
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          University & college finance
          Higher education & economics
      ab: Standard models of public education provision predict an implicit transfer of resources from higher-income individuals toward lower-income individuals. Many studies have documented that public higher education involves a transfer in the reverse direction. We show that this pattern of redistribution is an equilibrium outcome in a model in which education is only partially publicly provided and individuals vote over the extent to which it is subsidized. We characterize economies in which poorer individuals are effectively excluded from obtaining an education and their tax payments help offset the cost of education obtained by others. We show that increased inequality in the income distribution makes this outcome more likely and that the efficiency implications of this exclusion depend on the wealth of the economy. Reprinted by permission of Review of Economic Studies Ltd.
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    language: English
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